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The Story of My Life. By Clarence Darrow. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons. 1932. pp. viii, 457. $3.50.
THE romance and color of our judicial process is centered in the jury trial.
More efficient methods of judicial investigation can easily be imagined, but
none more picturesque. Perhaps it is to this that the jury owes its per-
sistence in the face of criticism. When a great government treats the
lowliest of criminals as an equal antagonist to the extent of stripping Its
judges of all powers except those of an umpire, it makes a gesture of
recognition to the dignity of the individual which has an extraordinary
dramatic appeal. It is not surprising that this symbol of individual liberty
can rise above all objections based on practical grounds. Its claim is on
our emotions, instead of our common sense. We feel that our conception
of freedom needs this concrete institution to give it reality.
Thus it is that out of the criminal jury trial the heroes of the law
arise. Just as foolish expeditions involving incredible hardships are organ-
ized to climb mountains and wander aimlessly about in polar regions in
the interests of science in order that a dignified body of learned gentlemen
may have its quota of heroes, so the criminal jury trial continues to be
admired and financed even in times of financial distress .in order to furnish
knights errant to the prosaic profession of the law.
Clarence Darrow's book is the absorbing story of one of those knights
errant of the law, who in spite of a lifetime of defending some of the most
unpopular causes of his time, has seen notoriety slowly change into fame,
and even a sort of sinister respectability.
Darrow's great legal battles-the Debbs case in 1893, the Haywood case
in 1906, the McNamara trial in 1911, and the Leopold-Loeb case in 1924-
were fought against the background of some of the most interesting social
conflicts of the last generation. The first three represented in the public
mind a conflict between the forces of public order and the supposedly anti-
social ambitions of labor organizations. The last dramatized the modern
psychiatric technique as an instrument in combating the public demand
for revenge against criminals. In it the old formula of "criminal respon-
sibility" was arrayed against a more kindly and tolerant conception con-
cealed under an imposing array of the long scientific terms of psychiatry.
Yet in discussing these cases Darrow does not appear to place them as
landmarks in a changing social consciousness. He is interested in the
defendants as individuals. A knightly ideal seems to compel him to rush
to the aid of a defendant in distress because society does not realize the
futility of government by punishment.
The keynote to Darrow's attitude throughout the book, in spite of his
protests to the contrary, is found in a complete emotional acceptance of
the supreme value of the individual. The importance of tolerant and
humane dealings between a government and its enemies is more important
to him than results in any series of cases; it is more important than the
comfort and security of any ruling class, more important even than public
order. It is an ethical ideal in which his faith never wavers, however
skeptical he may be of all other creeds and religions.
Toward Courts and the Law, Darrow shows little respect, but much
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tolerance, because he cannot think of anything better. At least they pro-
vide for that symbol of human liberty, the jury trial. He pursues a dream
of justice toward the underdog. It is tinged with melancholy because he
doubts the possibility of its realization, but its unattainable beauty drives
him to desert the more lucrative fields of the law, to defend cases which
enlist his sympathy, in a way which is truly heroic.
His book is a combination of an absorbing narrative -with philosophical
excursions into the nature of crime, the nature of the human mind, and
the nature of life itself. The sophisticated may criticize the philosophy
as naive, the psychiatry as sentimental, and the theories of crime as emo-
tional. As abstract ideas they lack critical analysis. But in their defense
it should be said that Darrow is not attempting to add to the sum total
of human knowledge but rather to increase human tolerance. A long list
of spectacular battles, fought with courage and lack of self-interest has
given him a belated national recognition, and an audience among those w-ho
admire a gallant fighter. Not to use that position to assault the ancient
prejudices against which he has struggled in criminal trials is to Darrow
unthinkable. His friends, John Altgeld and Eugene V. Debbs, and he him-
self bear the scars which bigoted piety and respectability always inflict
on a dissenter. Therefore he talks, with the same earnestness as to a jury,
to the plain, simple-minded, muddle-headed people, who operate our govern-
mental and educational institutions, whose blind fears so often make them
cross that dim line between safeguarding the social order against attack
and unnecessary governmental oppression. This part of the book is not
for those persons who like to think of themselves as scholars. Darrow is
not a philosopher, nor a scientist, nor a jurist, but a special pleader for
the individuals whom society seeks to punish. He is still trying his crim-
inal cases when he assails organized religion, and organized capital. The
assault is not that of a reformer, but of one who is as tolerant of the
oppressors as the oppressed. The result, therefore, is not the exposition
of brilliant or stimulating ideas, but rather the portrayal of a simple,
courageous and gallantly romantic personality-a sincere soldier in the war
for the liberation of mankind from the cruelties inspired by its fears.
To the reviewer's mind the development of such a personality is well
worth the liberation of a few socially unadjusted persons who conceivably,
according to some standards, might have been better off in jail.
Yale University. THURmAN A&.NoLu.
Soviet Administration of Criminal Justice. By Judah Zelitch.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1931. pp. xix,
418. $5.
IT is not an easy task for an outsider to gain a clear conception of the
underlying principles of Sovietism, whether in its every day manifestations
or its political and juridical aspects. The proposition is rendered all the
more difficult, if not altogether hopeless, when one attempts to form a
judgment on some particular phase of the present-day regime in Russia,
with no heed for its historical background, so that the thing observed is
conceived not as a complex functional result of a large number of hetero-
geneous antecedents, but merely as some "an und fur sich" thing existing
in abstracto.
Mr. Zelitch has made an earnest, and unquestionably honest, endeavor to
present a detailed account of the Soviet system of the administration of
criminal justice. For this purpose he has not only studied the Penal Codes
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of the U. S. S. R. and read a number of Soviet legal magazines, dccrees and
statutes, but he even went to Russia, spending there several months labori-
ously collecting material for his book and observing things "at close range."
An investigation undertaken on such a scale, and with the employment of
such elaborate methods, could not have failed to produce satisfactory, if not
excellent, results had the author taken into account that the adminis-
tration of criminal justice in the Soviet Union did not spring into existence
fully armed as Minerva from the head of Jupiter, but that it shaped itself,
despite the inflammatory language of its creators, under the potent in-
fluence of that very legal system which they so desperately denounced and
with which they were so eager to sever all relations. In a somewhat indirect
manner, Mr. Zelitch seems to have recognized this situation. Obviously
with the object in mind of linking the past to the present, he prepared his
Appendix No. 8 [pp. 381-405], which is a sketchy outline of the criminal
judicial system as it existed in Imperial Russia. Still, these few pages,
shyly appended to the end of the book and constituting, as it were, an intro-
duction to its Index, do not remedy the method of treating the various
problems inherent in the subject matter of the inquiry. Nor do casual refer-
ences to Imperial legislation, scattered throughout the book, help to rectify
the plan adopted by the author in his study. As a matter of fact, the vague
allusions to the famous Act of November 20th, 4864, interjected here and
there in the course of a narrative about Soviet efforts to put the Communist
judicial machinery in order, must prove rather confusing to American
readers, who, naturally, are not familiar with the pre-revolutionary history
of the Russian Court system.
From a methodological standpoint it would have been both helpful and
correct, before starting the discourse on the main theme, to lay first a firm
historical foundation for the phenomena dealt with. For instance, a parallel
examination, on the one hand, of the provisions of the Imperial Code of
Criminal Procedure, and on the other of those in the Code of the R. S. F.
S. R. (1922), discloses at once the lack of originality in the legal reasoning,
and the poverty of legal ideation, of the communist jurists who borrowed
freely and textually from the Imperial statutes, at times reproducing these
almost verbatim, but not infrequently supplementing them by some unex-
pected insertion which renders the meaning of the original quite obscure.
In the way of a mere illustration of this remark, Section 16 of the Imperial
Code should be compared with Section 4 of the Soviet Code.
This is but one example taken at random,1 but the significant point is
that Soviet penal legislation (procedural and substantive), together with
its many elementary errors, simply cannot be understood if the fact is over-
looked that Soviet statutes, in a large measure, are but deliberate and un-
skilled paraphrases of the pertinent Imperial enactments.
This remark is true not only of the language in which Soviet legislators
framed their penal laws, but of the penal system itself, in many of its most
vital phases. For instance, Mr. Zelitch very justly remarks that the pre-
I For those interested in a contrastive analysis of the Imperial and
Soviet Codes of Criminal Procedure, it may be suggested that the following
articles be, respectively, compared: Art. 21 and Art. 3; Art. 7 and Art. 6;
Art. 256 and Art. 103; Art. 416 and Art. 147; Art. 398 and Art. 137; Art.
294 and Art. 219; Art. 396 and Art. 131; Art. 265 and Art. 113, etc. Of
course, Soviet plagiarism in the field of legislation is by no means limited
to penal statutes only; it is even more conspicuous in the 1923 Civil Code
of the R. S. F. S. R., which reproduces verbatim, or nearly so, a largo
number of provisions contained in the Draft of the Imperial Civil Code




liminary inquiry (sledstvie) under Soviet law forms one of the most im-
portant stages in the proceedings prior to the trial [pp. 161, 162] ;: but this
element, indeed, is typical of the Continental system at large. It vests ex-
tensive authority in the person of the present-day Russian slcdovdtcl, the
German Untersuchngsrichter and the French judgc d'instruction. The same
procedural principal was firmly adopted by the Russian law of June 8, 1860,
that is, four years prior to the date of the Court Reform in Russia, and
has been faithfully adhered to ever since. The modifications in the general
status and scope of functions of the inquisitor (slcdoratcl), which were
introduced in the Soviet Criminal Code, as compared with the Imperial
Code, are so insignificant that they hardly deserve mention.- More particu-
larly, this is true of the method of the interrogation of the accused and the
means which the inquisitor was, and still is permitted to resort to in exam-
ining the future defendant. In this connection, it is interesting to compare
the text of Article 405 of the Imperial Code with that of Article 136 of the
Soviet Code. The former reads: "The inquisitor shall not seek to obtain
the confession of the accused by either promises, or ruses, or threats, or
similar measures of extortion."
Art. 136 of the Soviet Code was framed thus: "The inquisitor shall not
seek to obtain the testimony or confession of the accused by means of vio-
lence, threats and similar measures."
Whether or not Soviet inquisitors are actually abiding by this splendid
rule is a question which should not be discussed here, and which had better
be left open to speculation.
There is also a complete analogy between the Imperial and Soviet Codes
so far as the matter of mental imbalance of the accused is concerned. Con-
trary to the Anglo-Saxon system which requires a formal plea of insanity
in order that psychic debility may constitute a defense, the Russian Im-
perial Code (Art. 353) made it compulsory for the prosecuting attorney or
the inquisitor, to use Mr. Zelitch's terminology, to raise, of his own accord,
the question of irresponsibility whenever he had ground to believe that the
accused, at the time of the perpetration of the crime, was suffering from
mental disease. Whenever this occurred, the prosecuting attorney was in
duty bound to subject the accused to medical examination, and to under-
take an exhaustive investigation of his modes of behavior and his environ-
mental history. This procedure, as Mr. Zelitch states [p. 174], has been
left intact by the Soviets.3
No doubt there are in Soviet criminal justice a number of more or less
material deviations from the old procedure, such as the abolition of the
jury, the institution of co-judges, the term for completion of preliminary
investigation, the radical change in the method of the review of criminal
2 Here, I am referring exclusively to the likeness in the statutory provi-
sions of the two Codes without any reference to the actual practice of the
prosecuting attorneys (sledovatali) under the two r6gimes.
3 The inquiry into the mental state of the accused was never limited in
Russia to any specific or crystallized form of investigation such as we find
in the Belgium Service Anthropologique directed by Dr. Vervaekt, in the
Graz University Criminological Institute under Professor Adolf Lenz, in
the Bavarian "Krininalbiologischen Sanzmwlstelle," of which Dr. Viernstein
is in charge, etc. Of late, however, psycho-biological surveys of mentally
imbalanced defendants have been started in the Moscow Criminological
Clinic, which functions in conjunction with the State Institute for the
Inquiry into the Nature of Crime. (On this see paper by Dr. E. Krasmuch-
kin, Das Moskauer Kabinett fUr die Erforschung dr Pcrsonlchhcit des
Verbrechers -und der Kriainaltiit in 2 MrTTELUNGEN DERt KRIMNALBIO-
LOGISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT (Graz, 1929) pp. 186-211.
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cases, the deliberate confusion in the administration of justice of the judicial
and executive principles, and the like. These, and similar aspects of Soviet
judiciary, if the term is at all applicable to the court system in the U. S.
S. R., ate ably dealt with by Mr. Zelitch and must prove of interest to the
student of criminal procedure. In most cases, the author refrains grom
expressing any analytical views of his own on the matters which he lays
before the reader, thus leaving him at liberty to draw his own conclusions.
There is a great deal to be said in favor of such a method, but, on the
whole, perhaps, it might have been better if Mr. Zelitch had devoted
more space to a critical interpretation of the facts which he has learned
and observed. As it stands, the book is altogether too schematic, not merely
in its arrangement, but, equally, if not more so, from the standpoint of
the treatment of the subject.
Among the best chapters in the book is that entitled "Impressions and
Observations" (pp. 357-366], which is an account of the author's personal
contact with the communist criminal courts. Still, some of Mr. Zelitch's
comments probably will not be left unchallenged. For instance, why should
the shabby and dirty Soviet court room gladden an observer's heart and
prompt him to perceive there a "wholesome atmosphere saturated with the
spirit of delightful plainness and utter lack of officialdom"? This certainly
is a matter of taste, and as such it is open to argument. Nor is there any-
thing particularly revolting in the universal custom, which also prevails in
Soviet Russia, of having the defendant kept in the court room under armed
guard. And yet, referring to this point, Mr. Zelitch makes this bombastic
comment: "This survival of old Tzarist Russia makes a painful im-
pression. Being wholly unnecessary as protection, it is unjustifiable show
of brutality." [p. 360].
The chapter on the Soviet judiciary (pp. 327-356] contains a large number
of useful statistical data on the social and educational status of the Soviet
judges. Among other things, the appalling fact is revealed that 74% of
the judges of the provincial courts and 82% of the judges of the People's
Courts possess but elementary education, while the educational record of
the inquisitors, whose work constitutes the foundation of the entire crim-
inal procedure, is almost as low as that of the judges. These figures be-
speak the actual state of judicial affairs in Soviet Russia more eloquently
than voluminous treatises on this subject.
It is to be regretted that the book is not supplemented by a bibliographical
index which would more nearly bring it to the generally accepted standards
of a textbook.
Taking Mr. Zelitch's study as a whole, it might be conceived as a useful
contribution to the meagre literature on the administration of criminal
justice in the mysterious land known as the "U. S. S. R."
New York City. BORIS BRASOL.
Cases and Other Materials on Administrative Law. By Felix
Frankfurter and J. Forrester Davison. Chicago: Commerce
Clearing House, Inc. 1932. pp. xvi, 1177.
SOME years ago Professor Frankfurter, who has not yet been tapped for
"Realism," because he still lingers in the exoteric limbo of "sociological
jurisprudence,"' published a paper which he described as a general intro-




duction to a forthcoming series of Harvard Studies on Administrative
Law.2 He referred to the "fluid tendencies and tentative traditions" of
this blacksheep of Anglo-American law. Pointing to the presence of much
dynamic data, he called for "objective demonstration of intensive -cientific
studies," 3 which should proceed not along the accepted horizontal lines
of unitarian conceptualism, but rather, "vertically," which is to say, realis-
tically according to the nuances of varying administrative functions.
Recent experimentation at Harvard, as exemplified by these Cases on
Administrative Law which have been assembled and annotated by Pro-
fessor Frankfurter and his collaborator, Professor Davison of George
Washington University, indicates that the project announced in 1927 was
more than an aspiration. Not only does the preface reiterate the previous
announcement, but also the book itself, with the exception of the pages
on "Separation of Powers" in the beginning, which may be taken as the
authors' gracious bow to the traditions of their environment, represents a
well qualified companion for such volumes as Llewellyn's Cases and Ma-
terkals on the Law of Sales in that new and rapidly growing shelf of
realistic case books. For what honest difference can exist between a
sociological jurist who deals with cases vertically and a juristic realist
who sometimes seems oblique?
Profiting by the limitations of pioneer scholarship in the field which
conceived of Administrative Law as "law controlling the administration
and not as law produced by the administration," 4 the authors have made
no attempt to frame their volume in the outline of an ancient procedural
vocabulary. Rather, by setting out cases seriatim dealing with a suc-
cession of administrative functions, such as Utility Regulation, Taxation,
Control of Aliens and Federal Trade Regulation, they have made the ad-
ministrative agency itself live and function. This is a significant contribu-
tion to the facilities for teaching the subject. It is a recognition that today
it is just as important to know how administrative agencies themselves
function as it is to ascertain the extent to which their matters may be
transferred to the laps of the ordinary courts of law.
It is unfortunate that cases on administrative agencies must still be
grouped under "judicial control of administrative action," since that very
classification will tend to delay a study of the administrative function in
its own sphere. However, the authors of this volume by the technique
of designating cases according to the particular commission involved have
succeeded to a remarkable degree in accomplishing the desired shift of
emphasis.5 The sections dealing with utility regulation and taxation are
particularly effective in this respect, and it is regrettable that the sections
which follow could not have been amplified at the expense of those long
2 Frankfurter, Thw Task of Administrative Law (1927) 75 U. PA. L.
Riv. 614.
Ibid. 620.
4 FREUND, CASES ON ADINISTRATiVE LAw (2d ed. 1928) v.
Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 52 Sup. Ct. 235 (U. S. 1932), in which the
United States Supreme Court has extended the doctrine of Ohio Valley
Water Company v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct 527
(1920), to require trial de 7zovo in an ordinary court of law of the factual
question of a claimant's employment under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act. This case, together with the Court's more
recent pronouncements against irrebuttable presumptions of gifts for pur-
poses of administering a tax statute, indicates the unfortunate consequence




and tortuous pages in the beginning that treat of the great American
illusion called "Separation of Powers."
Another praiseworthy characteristic of the book is its generous store
of recent English decisions which reflect the background of Lord Chief
Justice Hewart's recent newspaper sensation over the new despotism of
Whitehall. These cases may be used to contrast the British concern over
inability to secure adequate court review of administrative rules and orders
with our own futile attempts to keep governmental agencies free of the
courts.
The size of the book need not baffle one who chooses it as the guide for
his course. It is possible to eliminate much that precedes page 500 and to
concentrate upon the functions of particular commissions, and thus to enter
almost at once into the realistic glories of the Harvard Studies In Ad-
minigtrative Law.
Yale University. RICHARD JoYCE SMITH.
Progress of Law in the United States Supreme Court, 1930-1931.
By Gregory Hankin and Charlotte A. Hankin. New York:
The Macmillan Company; Washington: Legal Research Serv-
ice. 1931. pp. xv, 525. $5.
THE third annual brain-child of the Hankins is no sport. Like its two pred-
ecessors, it packs into large print a faithful summary of the last instal-
ment of Supreme Court cases. Without benefit of details, it brings the
story up to date. Those who take their philosophy from Will Durant, their
food in concentrated form, may with equal satisfaction take their Supreme
Court lore from the Hankins.
It can be no easy task to boil down a term-full of Supreme Court deci-
sions. The Hankins do that well. Their intelligent choice of chapter head-
ings spares them the forced grouping that so often mars classiflcation for
convenience (although "Trade Regulation" in 29 pages involves a limita-
tion of the scope of that useful phrase, as unfortunate as the Cour'8 limita-
tion of the scope of the Trade Commission in F. T. C. v. Raladam Co.1).
Long decisions and dissents are reduced to the barest factual what and
legal why. Occasional quotes from Court opinions pay proper tribute to
the Court's occasional power to condense beyond condensation,
Insofar as the work is a non-selective summary it may seem immune to
criticism. The authors, in a preface to quiet critics, take pains to point out
the objective nature of their approach. All personal opinion is to be labelled
as such. Presumably only statements so labelled are to be considered fair
game.
Yet acceptance of expressed judicial reasoning, even as ground for per-
sonal disagreement, does not of necessity constitute the ultimate in objectiv-
ity. A critical analysis of the thinking ways of the nine justices might form
the basis of a far more accurate "bird's-eye view" of the Court's work than
that which the Hankins so proclaim. It might, for instance, explain away
the apparent disparity between the O'Gorman and the Minnesota "gag law"
decisions, which-the Hankins find hard to reconcile. Facts, after all, do not
need reconciling.
Even the opening chapter, which is entitled "Liberalism and Conservatism
in the Supreme Court" and which might better be entitled "The Liberalism
of Chief Justice Hughes," is given an objective'make-up. Mathematically
1283 U. S. 643, 51 Sup. Ct. 587 (1930).
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and logically, the Senators who protested his appointment and warned of
his Toryism are proven wrong,--even to the point of their overlooking the
conservative taxation stands that prove the liberal rule. Be it said, how-
ever, that this doughty defense of the Chief Justice is both cogent and
convincing. And be it added that not only the first chapter but the entire
volume is dedicated "To Chief Justice Hughes, Protector of Human Rights.:
The bulk of the book, however, is made up of Court opinions, paraphrased
and condensed. For those who want their intellectual food in even more
tabloid form, Gregory Hankin has summed up some of the more significant
cases in a 19-page pamphlet, published by Editorial Research Reports. And
then there are the official reports,-for those who somehow find the meat
of full opinions well worth a bit of chewing.
Harrisburg, Pa. FRD RoDELL.
Cowrts a d Doctors. By Lloyd Paul Stryker. New York: The
Macmillan Company. 1932. pp. mxv, 236. $2.
COURTS AND DocTORs deals mainly with the action for malpractice, its
causes, prevention and cure. Addressed to the medical profession, it is by
no means a dry statement of the law, but offers many pages of useful ad-
vice, much of it embedded in quotations. Thus the "Conclusion," so-called
because it comes at the end of the book, is largely borrowed from Dr.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, and is designed to remind the reader that character,
not legal sophistication, is the surest safeguard against an action for mal-
practice. The student of law, if only in his capacity as a patient, will find
the book both entertaining and instructive.
ir. Stryker has been for many years legal counsel to the Medical As-
sociation of the State of New York, and speaks of courts and doctors with
the knowledge given by long experience. His sympathetic association with
the physicians has evidently colored his point of view, and the book displays
a decided bias in favor of the noblest of all professions. The introduction
affords an opportunity for a panegyric on the achievements of modern
medicine, and its contributions to human welfare, and so leads up to an
almost horrified reference to an evil which a less dignified writer would
undoubtedly refer to as a "racket:" the action for malpractice. Mr. Stryker
in fact calls it "an ill which is due both to a public misunderstanding of
the medical profession and the unscrupulousness of certain types of
patients." Yet one cannot repress a sneaking sympathy for the man -who,
after suffering years of discomfort, the cause of which is finally diagnosed
as due to a pair of forceps left inside him at a previous operation, finds
his suit for malpractice barred by the Statute of Linitations, which runs not
from the time of the discovery of the forceps, but from the time of the
performance of the negligent act.
The relation between physician and patient is a peculiarly close and diffi-
cult one. The court must protect the patient from medical incompetence,
and at the same time protect the physician from the unreasonable demands
of patients, who are apt to credit him with a magical power to cure. Medi-
cine is not an exact science, but an art based on a vast and ever changing
body of scientific knowledge. Whether the physician has in fact exercised
the skill and care the law demands of him is in almost every case a question
to be decided on the basis of expert testimony.
Mr. Stryker discusses the vexed question of expert testimony at some
length. The qualifications of an "expert," in these days of specialism, are
in his opinion too leniently interpreted by the courts; so that doctors are
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allowed to testify on the validity of medical techniques with which they
have not the remotest acquaintance.
This difficulty is aggravated by the existence of "professional testifiers,"
attracted into court by the fee, and prepared to give an opinion on any
medical question. While he deplores such a practice, Mr. Stryker is firmly
persuaded that a gross injustice is done to the medical profession in those
states where no expert's fee can be claimed by the physician, who must
respond to a subpoena like any grocer. Here his devotion has been allowed
to cloud his judgment. He regards the physician's hard-won knowledge as
his property, his "capital," comparable to the grocer's store of tomatoes.
If the doctor is obliged to give his expert opinion on medical matters, re-
ceiving no recompense beyond the statutory witness fee, Ir. Stryker belioves
that an injustice is done him, since the grocer is not obliged to contribute
his store of tomatoes. This is of course absurd. Both lose only their time,
and their potential earnings. The doctor's testimony does not impair or
reduce his "store" of knowledge.
The physician whose time is unduly invaded by calls to servo as an expert
witness, for no more than the statutory fee, can find in Ccirts and Dootors
a remedy for his trouble. He has only to turn to Chapter xxiii, study the
twelve rules to be followed by the perfect witness, and break them all. No
lawyer who has read Chapter xxii, containing advice on the choosing of a
witness, will call him more than once.
Washington, D. C. BARBARA JONES.
Deportation of Aliens. By Jane Perry Clark. Columbia Studies in
History, Economics and Public Law, No. 351. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press. 1931. pp. 524. $5.
IN a period in which the press gives unwonted space to the problem of the
alien in the domestic labor market, in criminal matters and in deportation
cases,-a subject on which the Government itself receives such reports as
that of the Wickersham Commission-Miss Clark's book stands out as a
welcome contribution to the impartial and critical examination of a gitta-
tion the solution of which is of vital importance to this country. While Miss
Clark does not purport to write for a special audience, the technique of
her study, written in a style so fluid that at times it approaches the narra-
tive, its scope and detail commend it to any reader whose desire is a
thorough examination of the problem.
The treatment includes the history of deportation legislation, the pro-
cedure of deportation, and the various important individual problems under
statutes-such as public charge, moral turpitude, anarchists, prostitutes
and other "undesirables," and illegal entry. While those inclined to take a
strictly legal view of the problem might desire a position of greater Im-
portance for-the cases which finally reach the courts, the summaries of the
cases treated by the administrative authorities are of a value which cannot
be lightly estimated, and present a part of the record which too seldom
reaches the printed page. It is in fact these very summaries and the Infer-
mation concerning administrative procedure which lift the book out of the
-class of texts based purely upon statutes and judicial opinions, and which
-make it worthy of special study.
The disadvantages to which the alien involved in a deportation proceed-
ings is subjected, such as the unusual burden of proof which he must bear,
stand out clearly in the study of the various problems arising under the
statutes. Within each group of cases the changing attitude of statutes and
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courts and administrative officers, whether conflicting or harmonious, show
the drift of purpose in deportation cases. While the detailed and construc-
tive criticism is perhaps presented in so mild a form that the factual aspects
of the book remain dominant, yet whatever the critical reaction may be,
the fact remains that Miss Clark has built up an exceptional array of case
records in which excellent selective judgment has been demonstrated, and
has underscored the need for expert designers of statutes and for a per-
sonnel adequately trained to secure a just and efficient administration of
the statutes.
Yale University. PHoEBE Monnisox.
Patent Rights for Scientific Discoveries. By C. J. Hamson. In-
dianapolis: The Bobbs-Mferrill Co. 1930. pp. xvii, 286.
THE subject of this book, the proposed right of the discoverer of a pre-
viously unknown scientific "truth or fact" to remuneration from those who
make use of that discovery, is one that is relatively new in the United
States, although it has received much consideration in Europe and has been
discussed in detail by committees of the League of Nations, particularly 4
committee of experts in December, 1927. It is of interest to the people of
the United States insofar as protection to scientific discoveries is not ob-
tainable under the United States Statutes dealing with Letters Patent, by
which their subject-matter is limited to "any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ments thereof."' A new truth or fact is clearly not patentable within this
definition. However, if that new truth or fact is made use of by embodying
it in a new and useful process (included within the meaning of the word
"art") or machine or composition of matter, such process, machine, or com-
position of matter is patentable.
A very serious difficulty is met with at the threshold in defining what is
a newly discovered "truth or fact," as distinguished from the use that can
be made of it in the practical and industrial arts. It would seem that the
discovery of the truth or fact would be, in almost every case, inseparable
from the discovery of at least one such use that could be patented. For
example, a very fundamental discovery in electricity was that when a part
of a wire, forming a closed circuit, is passed close to a magnet a current
is generated in the circuit. That discovery is entirely capable of being
expressed as a patentable process.
On the other hand, a new mathematical concept of physics, such as the
mathematics of Einstein's relativity theory involving the fourth dimen-
sional space-time continuum, does not seem to be either a scientific discovery
or a patentable process. In the same class would seem to be the mathe-
matical formulm which express simple physical phenomena, such as the
formulm for centrifugal force, the acceleration of a freely falling body and
the innumerable equations involved in modern engineering. All discoveries
of this sort are mathematical expressions of an already existing law of
nature.
It is difficult to cite instances which do not fall into either of thcze classes,
that is, either a discovery of which the use, inseparably combined with the
discovery, is patentable, or the development of formulm of the laws of na-
ture. The truth was old, only its discovery was new. It does not seem
reasonable that the engineer or chemist should have to pay for the use of
'29 Stat. 692 (1897), 35 U. S. C. § 31 (1926).
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such a formula, discovered by a scientist, to aid him in practical manufac-
ture and use.
What is a newly discovered "truth or fact" which should be the property
of the scientist who discovered it?
Mr. Hamson does not explain a single instance of the kind of scientific
"truth or fact" with which the book deals. He assumes that the reader
knows what such a truth or fact is. His thesis would have more appeal if
he had given instances of the sort of scientific discoveries under considera-
tion and explained how and why they have failed to profit their discoverers.
All the questions, however, that have been raised and seem likely to be
raised with relation to the subject, are gone into with the most meticulous
care. The question of how the rights to a "scientific discovery" shall be
defined and enforced against those who make a profit from its commercial
use is dealt with in detail. A strong advocate of legislation which would
accomplish the desired results, Mr. Hamson reviews the history of the de-
velopment of the efforts to formulate definitions which seem intolerably
vague and general, and to prescribe the way in which the scientist shall be
remunerated by those who use his discovery in the industrial arts. His pro-
posal for compensation follows the compulsory license system for patents
in Great Britain. The scientist would be required to register his discovery
within three months of his disclosure of it to the public, and, as is now
the practice in Great Britain in the case of patents, opposition to the regis-
tration would be allowed. The text of a "Proposed Statute" is set out on
page 178.
He realizes the great practical difficulties of awarding just compensation
by the manufacturer to the scientist. To facilitate this, he suggests that a
corporation be formed which would own the discovery as soon as it was
registered and hold it as trustee for the benefit of the scientist. The manu-
facturer is to apply to the corporation for permission to use the discovery
and the corporation is to fix the remuneration to the scientist. If several
scientific discoveries are embodied in one manufacture, the corporation is
to apportion a share to each scientist.
To those who-are interested in securing to scientists a proper remunera-
tion for their unpatentable discoveries, the book is a mine of accurate in-
formation on what has been done, what has been proposed and the reasons
for and against every proposition. It is a thorough piece of work. But be-
fore it becomes of more than academic interest to the people of the United
States, it would seem that there must be a much more serious and wide-
spread demand than, now exists for the protection of scientists in their
discoveries of truths and facts which are not patentable. Today large
corporations have energetic research departments. Technical schools of
learning and research cooperate. They are all inspired with the high pur-
pose of finding not only new truths and facts but practicable ways of
making use of them "to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts." - It is rare indeed that a new truth or fact is discovered which is
not ipso facto of new practical use. Such use, as already pointed out, is
patentable under our present laws.
Boston, Mass. J. LEWIS STACKPOLM.
2 U. S. Constitution, Art. 1, §8, Cl. 8.
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Anum.1 Digest of Public Intenwtinw.l Law Cases. 1927, 1923.
Edited by Arnold McNair and H. Lauterpacht. New York:
Longmans, Green & Co. 1931. pp. li, 592. $15.
THis is the second volume of a series being prepared by the editors con-
taining digests of cases decided by the courts of various countries and by
international tribunals bearing on some phase of public international law.
The first volume, which appeared in 1929, included the cases decided during
the years 1925-1926. The present volume, which covers the years 1927-1928,
contains three hundred and eighty-nine digests, representing nearly every
country in the world. Almost half the cases come from international tribu-
nals of some form, including the World Court, the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration, and a number of mixed claims commissions.
The volume has all the merits and limitations of a good digest. Its use
will not, as the editors point out in the preface, and the volume is not
expected to, make a reference to the actual decisions unnecessary for those
who desire a thorough understanding of a case. It will, however, and this,
according to the editors, is the chief purpose of the volume, "stimulate and
facilitate recourse to the actual decisions."
The digests of the cases consist of a statement of the facts and a sum-
mary of or direct quotation from the holdings of the tribunal on the
points of law involved. The cases are dissected and the holdings on the
different principles of law are placed under the appropriate headings, so
that a particular case often appears under several topics.
There are in the vdlume cases involving practically all the principal divi-
sions of public international law. The digests are classified under the follow-
ing topics: international law in general, states as international persons,
state territory, jurisdiction, state responsibility, the individual in interna-
tional law, diplomatic and consular intercourse and privileges, treaties, in-
ternational organization and administration, disputes, and war and neu-
trality.
In addition to the table of contents there is a more detailed classification
of the subjects covered, as well as an alphabetical table of the cases digested,
a table of the cases cited, and a classification of cases according to the
countries from which they are taken.
The volume will be a most useful one as a ready reference to which stu-
dents and practitioners can turn and find the holdings of a case, and the
editors have rendered a distinct service to all interested in the rapidly ex-
panding field of public international law. The next two volumes covering
the six years 1919 to 1924 inclusive, which the editors indicate will appear
soon, will be awaited with interest.
University of Kentucky. E. G. TmmLE.
The British Year Book of Ihternation'. Law 1931. New York:
0xford University Press. 1931. pp. vi, 271. $6.
Tnn high standards of its predecessors are maintained in the present vol-
ume. Professor Brierly of Oxford, in an article on the future of codification,
points out the misconceptions attached to the term "codification" and sug-
gests that it be applied only in the sense of legislation on new or admittedly
disputed subjects on which agreement is measurably assured before a so-
called codification conference meets. It is in this sense that the British
Government, in its observations of April 28, 1931, to the League of Nations,
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